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With the recent attention given to decision analysis in the medical literature, many
clinicians are probably asking themselves, "Will decision analysis prove to be useful
in clinical medicine? Is it worthwhile to learn about this newfield?"
To an optimist who believes we can come to understand how peoplethink, decision
analysis seems to offer the hope of making more manageable and rational the often
very complicated decisions that doctors must make every day. Should an exploratory
operation be done on a patient with possible appendicitis? Should a patient with a
sore throat have a throat culture or receive penicillin without further tests? Should a
hypertensive patient have a work-up, including an intravenous pyelogram? Each
course of action has benefits and costs that a clinician must weigh in reaching a deci-
sion. The current method for doing the weighing is an informal process called
"clinicaljudgment" or "intuition."
While the optimist hopes that a formal analytic process may help doctors make
better decisions, the pessimist suspects that "decision trees," "probability assess-
ments," and "utilities" may be inadequate to deal with the important subtle judg-
ments that enter into actual decisions.
In this issue ofthe YaleJournalofBiology andMedicine, Kassirer describes some
ofthe basic procedures ofdecision analysis and illustrates their application to clinical
problems. The fundamental strategies of decision analysis seem quite straightfor-
ward:
1. Outline the structure ofthe problem; i.e., make adecision-flow diagram or deci-
sion tree showing each possible course of action and the possible outcomes for each
action.
2. At each branch point where the outcome is determined not by choice but is left
to chance (such a branch point is called a "chance node"), estimate numerically the
probability ofoccurrence for each outcome.
3. For each possible outcome, assign a relative value called a "utility."
4. Multiply each utility value by the associated probability ofoccurrence to obtain
a score for that outcome. Sum the scores of the possible outcomes at a "chance
node" to obtain an expected utility for that node. Then sum the scores at the chance
nodes associated with an action to obtain the expected utility ofthat action.
5. Choose theinitial action that has thehighest calculated expected utility.
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Despite the appeal of this apparently simple procedure, we can run into many
problems, as Kassirer has pointed out, when we try to reduce a complicated clinical
situation to a form necessary for application of a decision-analysis model. To the
extent that the reductions (or assumptions) distort or oversimplify the reality of the
clinical situation, the analysis can be wrong or misleading. The opportunities to
create such distortions arise (a) in outlining the decision tree, (b) in making the
probability estimations, and (c) in assigning utility values to the outcomes. Some of
these sources ofdistortion are more easily dealt with than others.
The structure of the decision tree will be faulty ifit does not show all the important
possible courses of events. For example, in Kassirer's illustration of the use of deci-
sion analysis to choose a football play, the three courses evaluated were the attempts
to pass, to try a field goal, or to run. Other possible choices that were not considered
include a faked field goal followed by a run or an option play in which the choice to
pass or run is made while the play is developing. If these additional courses of action
are possible and reasonable but are not considered in a decision analysis, then the
structure is unsatisfactory because the problem has not been completely evaluated
and the results may therefore be misleading. An important first step in decision
analysis, therefore, is outlining and identifying all the various courses of action and
their possible outcomes. The issue of satisfactory structure is therefore a serious
problem in decision analysis, but it probably is manageable.
The next procedural step allows a different opportunity for distortion. At each
chance node, a quantitative assessment must be made about the probability of each
outcome. Where do these numbers come from? The values obtained from published
medical literature may be inappropriate because the reported cases may differ from
the patient under consideration. For example, if a decision must be made about
whether to operate for subphrenic abcess in a 60-year-old patient with severe dia-
betes mellitus, such a patient is in a very special group for which the literature may
not contain quantitative information. As Kassirer points out, when the literature
provides unsatisfactory answers, the situation requires the "judgment of an
experienced clinician," applying his "common sense" as he has done in the past. The
judgment, however, must be applied in a quantitative way, a process that clinicians
may find quite difficult. The estimation of probabilities thus creates another serious
but probably manageable problem in decision analysis.
The difficulty that may not be manageable arises at the next step in the proceed-
ings: the assignment of utility values to each outcome. Entities such as death, pain,
loss of employment, pharmaceutical side-effects, human gratifications, and other
significant outcomes of medical conditions must all be given numerical values that
appropriately reflect the associated benefits and detriments. Three major problems
arise when utility values are assigned to outcomes. The first is the problem of choos-
ing a number to express an intangible "utility" or value. The second is the problem of
expressing on one scale the values of outcomes originally measured on several
different scales. The third is the problem of who will determine the utility values.
The first of these major difficulties is that many important outcome values are in-
tangible and are therefore not easily measurable. What is the numerically measur-
able "utility" to a family of a peaceful, nonprotracted death for a relative? What is
the utility of avoiding an unwanted pregnancy? What is the utility ofavoiding a severe
penicillin reaction? To be handled in a decision analysis, the worth ofthese intangible
entities would have to be expressed in numbers. Even in the business world, where
many outcomes are already conveniently measured in numbers (dollars), intangible
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outcomes (such as morale or reputation) must still be handled numerically in a deci-
sion analysis. Converting these intangible outcomes into numbers is quite difficult.
For example, to convert morale into a number, a businessman might be asked by a
decision analyst a long series ofhypothetical questions such as, "What would you be
willing to pay to avoid a 10% chance oflosing the morale ofyour sales department?"
The problem of giving numerical magnitudes to intangible values is profound and is
not amenable to easy solution with any existing methodologic procedures.
The second difficulty in trying to use "utilities" in medicine is that many outcomes
have multiple attributes. All these attributes, each measured in its own scale, would
have to be assigned values on a single numerical scale for a problem to be handled by
decision analysis. For example, in Kassirer's illustration of a choice about operation
for subphrenic abcess, to assign a utility value for an outcome event such as "serious
surgical complications, lesion repaired," we would have to examine a group of
separate attributes including time lost from work (measured in days), economic cost
of hospitalization (measured in dollars), pain (measured in some appropriate units),
and benefit of successful drainage of abcess (measured in other appropriate units).
The composite "utility" of all these attributes would have to be expressed on one
scale in some common unit of measurement. This double task ofconverting intangi-
ble and multi-attribute outcomes into meaningful numbers creates a major difficulty
that is inherent in decision analysis and that cannot be managed readily ifat all.
A third serious problem in assigning "utilities" arises because every decision
analysis must have a decision maker, who, in clinical medicine, could be a patient, a
doctor, a hospital, or "society." Each of these subjects might assign different utility
values to the same outcome. For example, "society" as a decision maker might place
a small utility on trying to save the life of a cirrhotic patient in coma with gastroin-
testinal bleeding. To this patient's family, however, the utility might be great. Deci-
sion analysis itself provides no way to resolve the conflict in rating these utilities be-
cause the source of the conflict is the natural difference in values between society and
a person or between different people. The use ofdecision analysis would force some
of these conflicts into open discussion, since a formal analysis requires that an ex-
plicit value be placed on each outcome. The relative magnitudes assigned to the many
diverse aspects of human life would create major controversies and debate. Despite
the desirability of open discussion for issues of who makes the decisions and who
assigns the "utilities," the process would be arduous and probably inconclusive.
Thus, even if we can master the first two challenges and develop a quantitative
methodology for assessing utilities, there is still the problem ofdeciding who does the
assessment. The failure to solve any one of these difficult problems at the third step
in the proceedings will be fatal for the practical application of formal decision
analysis.
Despite these problems, the component parts of a decision analysis can still be
clinically helpful. Doing the tasks required at each of the three main steps of the
analysis may be instructive and may ultimately improve a clinician's intuition orjudg-
ment. In outlining the structure of a decision, physicians will have to increase the at-
tention used to anticipate all possible outcomes. A frequent example of the lack of
such attention is the ordering of a test that cannot affect the patient's treatment or
clinical course. By making such problems more evident, the use of a decision-tree
structure may help in their solution. In trying to estimate probabilities at each
chance node, physicians will have to examine the medical literature to find out what
numbers should be used. This examination will probably reveal large gaps in existing
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knowledge and may thereby suggest important directions for future research. In try-
ing to assign utility values to outcomes, physicians will have to examine not only the
important intangible aspects of clinical outcomes but also the legitimate conflicts in
values between different decision makers.
These individual parts ofdecision analysis can thus make substantial contributions
to clinical thinking even ifthe parts themselves cannot be integrated effectively into a
whole. The current cautious attitude towards decision analysis in the business world
(1) suggests that the integrated, formal procedure by itself will not become a satis-
factory method for answering complex clinical questions. Clinicians will probably
continue to rely mainly on "intuition," "common sense," and other unquantified
modes of reasoning to make decisions. Nevertheless, for those clinicians who accept
the challenges of utilizing the component parts and who approach these challenges
with both patience and skepticism, decision analysis may help in understanding,
dissecting, and improving the elements ofclinicaljudgment.
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